Notes on Nietzsche 09: The Belief in Unbelief

 Book V, We Fearless Ones, The Joyful Wisdom

“It is said with good reason that convictions have no civic rights in the domain of science: it is only when a conviction voluntarily condescends to the modesty of an hypothesis, a preliminary standpoint for experiment, or a regulative fiction, that its access to the realm of knowledge, and a certain value therein, can be conceded,—always, however, with the restriction that it must remain under police supervision, under the police of our distrust.—Regarded more accurately, however, does not this imply that only when a conviction ceases to be a conviction can it obtain admission into science? Does not the discipline of the scientific spirit just commence when one no longer harbours any conviction?”

In the era of science and objective thought, doubt occupies a higher rung of our hierarchy of values than belief. Perhaps this is not just the way of the times we live in, but has been the case for centuries, that the skeptic was accorded more respect than the believer. But there is no doubt that the cult of skepticism has overtaken our world so strongly that it is almost considered to be a given that one who questions everything is more likely to produce wisdom than one who doesn’t. Indeed, it is important to question, but it is not always obvious that the skeptics of today question in pursuit of answers. Rather, it seems that the act of questioning itself is the answer. Or worse, the belief in the unbelief, which, in other words, is called nihilism, seems to be the point of the questioning: as if the skeptic wishes to stop the act as soon as the nihilistic perspective answers the question. And the nihilist rarely cares for the question, or even if he does, he has a one-stop answer to all questions. Why not, instead, take the nihilistic perspective as a foothold? Why not question nihilism? Maybe we need to go through nihilism to find out the value of belief, the value of valuing.

“It is probably so: only, it remains to be asked whether, in order that this discipline may commence, it is not necessary that there should already be a conviction, and in fact one so imperative and absolute, that it makes a sacrifice of all other convictions. One sees that science also rests on a belief: there is no science at all "without premises." The question whether truth is necessary, must not merely be affirmed beforehand, but must be affirmed to such an extent that the principle, belief, or conviction finds expression, that "there is nothing more necessary than truth, and in comparison with it everything else has only a secondary value."—This absolute will to truth: what is it? Is it the will not to allow ourselves to be deceived? Is it the will not to deceive? For the will to truth could also be interpreted in this fashion, provided one includes under the generalisation, "I will not deceive," the special case, "I will not deceive myself." But why not deceive? Why not allow oneself to be deceived?”

Science is often brandished by the skeptics as their banner, and rightly so, for science does question, but it also seeks to find answers. That means it presumes that there is an answer. And more often than not, it suspects it knows the answer, and sets out to prove it. What else is this suspicion if not a conviction, a belief that there is an answer and it can be found and it is better to find it than not? 

“Let it be noted that the reasons for the former eventuality belong to a category quite different from those for the latter: one does not want to be deceived oneself, under the supposition that it is injurious, dangerous, or fatal to be deceived,—in this sense science would be a prolonged process of caution, foresight and utility; against which, however, one might reasonably make objections. What? is not-wishing-to-be-deceived really less injurious, less dangerous, less fatal? What do you know of the character of existence in all its phases to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of absolute distrust, or of absolute trustfulness?”

We were flung into the earth bereft of the bliss of Eden, after Adam’s transgression. Or, if the creationist view is not tasteful to your ears, let me put it differently. We woke up as apes in a world we did not understand, in a limitless sea of chaos, and we tried to establish rules. We began gripping, possessing, owning, and we made rules of property. We made rules of equal distribution of scarce resources, when fighting to death over them became too much for us. We established a currency for the exchange of goods and services. We built religious and cultural interpretative frameworks to erect hierarchies of value, and placed an ultimate higher value at its pinnacle. We came up with legislation to anchor our hard-earned wisdom as we went about our business, exploring, predating, reproducing. We interpreted because we did not understand. And questioning the age-old systems and structures in place can cause them to disintegrate beyond our control. Of course, that does not mean we should not question or distrust. It was our distrust that prompted the improvement of these systems and frameworks, to begin with.

“In case, however, of both being necessary, much trusting and much distrusting, whence then should science derive the absolute belief, the conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important than anything else, even than every other conviction? This conviction could not have arisen if truth and untruth had both continually proved themselves to be useful: as is the case. Thus—the belief in science, which now undeniably exists, cannot have had its origin in such a utilitarian calculation, but rather in spite of the fact of the inutility and dangerousness of the "Will to truth," of "truth at all costs," being continually demonstrated. "At all costs": alas, we understand that sufficiently well, after having sacrificed and slaughtered one belief after another at this altar!”

Although science has solved a myriad of problems we face and enhanced our quality of life considerably, it is very likely that it did not evolve at the hands of compassionate, selfless persons who sought to develop a tool for the “greater good”. It evolved when man scrutinised and vivisected one interpretative framework after another in a fit of rage, furious that the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge had made him conscious of exactly how little he knew. In science and rational thought, man found a certain comfort, for it was comprised of more “fixed truths” than the rest, but since the search for truth preceded the search for objective truth, it is safe to say that the latter was an offshoot of the former.

“Consequently, "Will to truth" does not imply, "I will not allow myself to be deceived," but—there is no other alternative—"I will not deceive, not even myself": and thus we have reached the realm of morality. For, let one just ask oneself fairly: "Why wilt thou not deceive?" especially if it should seem—and it does seem—as if life were laid out with a view to appearance, I mean, with a view to error, deceit, dissimulation, delusion, self-delusion; and when on the other hand it is a matter of fact that the great type of life has always manifested itself on the side of the most unscrupulous multifaceted one. Such an intention might perhaps, to express it mildly, be a piece of Quixotism, a little enthusiastic craziness; it might also, however, be something worse, namely, a destructive principle, hostile to life.... "Will to Truth,"—that might be a concealed Will to Death.”

Our schools teach us to view Nature as a potential repository of benefits that we can make use of in a scientific manner. But Nature is not a victim at the hands of mankind. We are its prey. Nature makes sure to steal occasions to hurl death at us from every corner it possibly can, and we do our darnedest to survive. And it is this refusal to not let Nature kill us at every chance it gets that Nietzsche renames as our refusal to allow ourselves to be deceived, our refusal to let our ignorance stand in our way of our survival. However, it is also possible that this refusal can make us forget to look for truth in the pursuit of knowledge and ultimately end up breeding legions of men who are more intelligent than they are wise. 

“But what I have in view will now be understood, namely, that it is always a metaphysical belief on which our belief in science rests,—and that even we knowing ones of to-day, the godless and anti-metaphysical, still take our fire from the conflagration kindled by a belief a millennium old, the Christian belief, which was also the belief of Plato, that God is truth, that the truth is divine.... But what if this itself always becomes more untrustworthy, what if nothing any longer proves itself divine, except it be error, blindness, and falsehood;—what if God himself turns out to be our most persistent lie?”

Science is built and furthered on the premise that it is immoral to not question, to not look for truths, to not disbelieve. Of course, science equates truth with objective truth, but still it does rest on the premise that it is moral to seek truth, a belief that stands outside the realm of objectivity. So, if science cannot be divorced from morality, how long before the nihilists strike at its roots with their axes? What if objective thought and rationality, that has been anointed with holy waters and (as good as) been given the place of the ultimate higher value, also collapses? Will “error blindness, and falsehood” take its place? What if the belief in a higher ultimate value (read God) is supplanted with the belief in unbelief? Who will walk with God then*? Who will build the Ark to save us from that Flood?

*"Noah was a just man and perfect in his generations, and Noah walked with God."
   - Gen. 6:9 (King James Version).